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THE AMBIGUITIES OF PLEDGING FAITH
H. JEFFERSON POWELL*
When I first read Professor Levinson's provocative challenge to
reconsider our own allegiance to the Constitution, I had a most
distressing-and, for a law professor, unusual-feeling of having
nothing to say. For me, a refusal to sign the Constitution would
simply be, in Professor Levinson's words, "a far more hostile gesture than I am capable of."' The Constitution, and the political
structure and national community that it symbolizes, are too much
a part of me for me honestly and realistically to repudiate. But of
course, I too am a member of the privileged class-that segment of
the American people that created the Constitution (largely for its
own benefit), administered the Constitution (again, for the most
part in its selfish interest), and garnered the lion's share of American prosperity and security under the Constitution. It would be
remarkable if I didn't think well of it. But that, of course, is no
compliment, either to me or to the Constitution. For me, Professor
Levinson's paper was a forcible reminder of the ease with which I
can sign, an ease not shared by black Americans, female Americans, poor Americans, or many others.
So, on first reading I found that as a commentator I had a real
problem: I agree with the conclusion Professor Levinson reaches
and I admire and concur in his sensitive discussion of the moral
ambiguities of that conclusion. On a second reading, however, I began to realize that originally I missed or glossed over an important,
if largely implicit, aspect of Professor Levinson's remarks. One
would expect Professor Levinson, of all people, to be as interested
in the process of decisionmaking as in the decision reached.' And
so I began to consider the pointed nature of his concluding ques* Associate Professor of Law, University of Iowa. I wrote these comments while a visitor
at Yale Law School, and I appreciate the school's support.
1. Levinson, Pledging Faith in the Civil Religion; Or, Would You Sign the Constitution?,
29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 113, 144 (1987).
2. See P. BREST & S. LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING (2d ed.
1983).
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tion: "What is your Constitution, and are you willing to sign it?" 3
That is not, I realized, just an invitation to agree or disagree with
his paper; it is a challenge to do what he has done: to recount and
reexamine one's own personal constitutional story from one's personal and idiosyncratic perspective. That is what I will try to do
here.
My personal starting point in thinking about constitutional matters is usually historical. In addressing Professor Levinson's question, therefore, I would like to call to my aid an historical figure
whom I find rather intriguing, Hugh Swinton Legare. Legare was a
white South Carolinian prominent in American letters and politics
from 1820 until his death in 1843; for the last two years of his life
he served as Attorney General of the United States. In many ways
Legare was the archetype of the antebellum Charleston gentleman:
college educated in South Carolina and Scotland, socially polished,
intimately and equally acquainted with the ancient classics, contemporaneous European civilization, and American literature and
law, and a slaveholder who fastidiously conceded slavery's abstract
evil while staunchly denying the realistic possibility of abolition. In
short, at first glance Legare is not an obvious candidate to help me
or anyone else today address Professor Levinson's challenge.
Legare wrote an essay in 1828, however, that seems to me to bring
together and express with dramatic clarity several of the problems
with my Constitution that I need to confront before deciding
whether to sign it.
Legare's essay formed part of a book review of Chancellor James
Kent's Commentaries on American Law,4 which is often regarded
as the first great American legal treatise, "The American Blackstone." Legare was an admirer of Kent, and the review was glowing. But embedded within it is a short essay on contemporaneous
constitutional law that is one of the most damning indictments of
the United States Constitution ever penned. The essay concludes:
"The mischief has already been done-the first step is taken, the
whole system is radically wrong." '5 There can be no doubt how
3. Levinson, supra note 1, at 144.
4. H. LEGARE, Book Review, in 2 WRITINGS OF HUGH SWINTON LEGARE 102 (M. Legare ed.
1845) (reviewing J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW (1826-27), in 2 S. REV., Aug.
1828, at 72).
5. Id. at 133 (emphasis in original).
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Legare would have answered Professor Levinson's question in
1828. But why? What led this comfortable and conservative lawyer
to so startling a conclusion?
In a way, the answer to this question is obvious. As a white
South Carolinian, Legare was opposed to national power when exercised to favor Northern industry or, potentially, to threaten slavery. As an opponent of nullification, Legare was opposed to exercises of federal authority that, by exciting alarm, might tip the
political balance in South Carolina toward the nullifiers. All this is
true, but it is not, of course, what I find useful. I want instead to
explore the explanations Legare gave for the Constitution's emergence as a threat to his values.
The first charge in Legare's indictment was an accusation that
will sound familiar: the federal government created by the Constitution had been transformed, Legare wrote, from "one of enumerated powers and a circumscribed sphere" into one that "knows absolutely no bounds but the will of a majority of Congress."' 6 In
language used here at the symposium, an original Constitution of
frustration had become a Constitution of possibility, at least of
governmental possibility. In hindsight, to make this charge against
the remarkably weak and limited federal government of 1828
seems faintly laughable, but as a prophecy of 1987, I think it is
difficult to argue with Legare's assertion that Congress is "to all
intents and purposes, omnipotent in theory,"'7 or as I would put it,
omnicompetent with regard to all legitimate governmental means
and ends. Legare got the timing wrong, to be sure. It took more
than "the course of a very few years" for the federal government to
assert jurisdiction over "all the pursuits, the interests, the opinions
and the conduct" of Americans." But surely it has done so now. My
Constitution in 1987 authorizes national regulation of the most parochial of human activities and recognizes no principled limits on
the scope of national concern except those limits found in the enclaves of personal liberty and equality of protection created by the
Bill of Rights.

6. Id. at 123.
7. Id. at 124.
8. Id. at 123.
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There are several possible responses to Legare's observation or
prophecy about federal power. One I am attracted to says, "So
what?" This position was put most forthrightly by Charles Black a
few years ago.' Black argues that the gradual creation of a genuinely national government empowered to deal effectively with any
concern of importance to a national legislative majority is one of
the great historical and constitutional achievements of the American people. I0 It is a cause for celebration, not a confession of despair. To question national omnicompetence, he points out, is to
question America as we know it, the good as well as the evil." To
question is, in Professor Levinson's terms, to refuse to sign.
Another possible response to the accusation of change is to deny
change. One can point to the nationalist train of thought present
at Philadelphia and in the Federalist Party of Washington and
Hamilton. As more and more social issues became genuinely national, the federal government naturally and appropriately took up
and exercised powers to which it was always potentially entitled.
There is truth for me in both of these responses, and I certainly
agree with Professor Black that the dream of dismantling the current national government and replacing it with what Black described as a "collection of fifty rustic and decaying urban republics" is a nightmare. 2 I am aware that Legare's concerns were
fueled in part by his fear of one of the things I value most in my
Constitution: a national government empowered to combat racism.
But even accepting all this, I think Legare made a point that has
continuing validity. Despite the existence of nationalism from the
beginning, it seems clear to me that for most of the Founders, the
Constitution contemplated a federal government with some limits
to its powers and responsibilities. My Constitution of national
omnicompetence is a confession that this original experiment in
limited federal authority failed. This failure is significant not only
to political theorists. When I contemplate the enormous concentration of power in the contemporary federal government and the erratic and wayward behavior of many of its recent stewards,

9. Black, On Worrying About the Constitution, 55 U. COLO. L. REv. 469 (1984).
10. Id. at 469.
11. See id. at 484-85.
12. Id. at 477.
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Legare's fear of the "accumulation of power" 13 begins to make
some sense. My Constitution endorses that accumulation for the
sake of the good and just ends to which that power can be directed. But Legare reminds me that our constitutional history
demonstrates nothing so clearly as the futility of predicting "the
results of [bur] own political contrivances.' 1 4 If the limited government of 1789 can become the omnicompetent one of 1987, Legare
may well be right that "no man can pretend to anticipate what
shape the constitution of the United States
is destined to
15
take."' The New Deal and the Great Society, in other words,
might be followed by a New Order with a different moral cast.
One might say that the transformation from limited to unlimited
government was a mistake, the result of error or usurpation on the
part of the national authorities. If only Congress, the President, or
the Supreme Court had interpreted the Constitution correctly, the
limits on national power would have remained in place. This, I
suppose, is the theoretical, although certainly not the pragmatic,
view of the present federal administration. But it is precisely with
regard to this claim that I find Legare most fascinating, and most
disturbing, for it was his contention in 1828 that the fundamental
problem with the Constitution stemmed not from legislative or judicial error, but from the very nature of the American constitu16
tional experiment.
"Our political opinions," Legare wrote of Americans, "have been
hitherto, in the last degree, wild and visionary
We have unbounded faith in forms, and look upon a written constitution as a
sort of talisman, which gives to the liberties of a nation 'a charmed
life.' "'7 The written Constitution, Legare was reminding his readers, was meant to limit and channel governmental power, either by
specifying government's legitimate authority or by defining ends
and means that government was forbidden to use. But in fact,
Legare claimed, "the effect of a written Constitution, interpreted
by lawyers in a technical manner, is to enlarge power and to sanc-

13. H.
14.
15.
16.
17.

LEGARE, supra note 4, at 124.
Id. at 123.
Id. at 130.
See generally H. LEGARE, supra note 4.
Id. at 124, 125.
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tify abuse, rather than to abridge and restrain them."'" The very
means the Founders chose to prevent injustice became, in fact, the
most insidious and powerful instrument of injustice.
How so? Legare pointed to a variety of ways in which the verbal,
textual, documentary nature of the Constitution rendered it dangerous. First, to write down a constitution is to deliver it into the
hands of those Legare scornfully called "mere professional lawyers,""' despite the fact that Legare himself was a lawyer and was
no despiser of legal professionalism. Lawyers approach documents,
including constitutions, "by technical rules" of interpretation.20
They address moral and political controversies through a pseudologic of precedent and analogy that obscures their inevitable progression from sense to nonsense. Legare wrote of lawyers' constitutional arguments: "The consequences in [their] deductions shall be
inevitable, and no man be able to say this or that link in the chain
of reasoning is bad; on this side is Ionia and not Peloponnesus-here law ends and usurpation begins."'" When constitutional discussion-high political debate over justice, freedom, and
equality-becomes lawyers' disputation over the meaning of text
and precedent, "[w]e look in vain for that plain . . . unsophisticated sense-that instinct of liberty, which characterizes the controversial reasoning of the great fathers of the English constitution-the Seldens, the Sidneys, the Prynnes-and their worthy
22
descendants and disciples, the founders of our own revolution.
In other words, Legare argued that the practices of legal reasoning
blind those who employ them to the truly constitutional questions
of equality and oppression, justice and wrong.
Turning constitutional debate into legal wrangling not only perverts the substantive discussion, Legare wrote, it also inhibits the
ability of the people at large to control and correct their governors. 23 In a remarkable anticipation of an argument of Alexander
Bickel, Legare suggested that the Supreme Court's decision to uphold the constitutionality of a statute or other governmental action

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. at 124.
Id. at 125.

Id.
Id. at 131.
Id. at 125 (emphasis in original).
Id.
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functions as a legitimation of that statute or action. "The people at
large, after a few unheeded murmurs, submit to this imposing authority, and think that their discontents must be unreasonable, because their understandings have been puzzled by sophisters, and
awed by the learning of the bench! ' 24 The end result of having a
written Constitution is to enable governmental actors to deny or
conceal their political choices and to work "an estoppel . . . upon
[the] just complaints" of the victims of injustice.25
I recognize a disturbingly familiar picture in Legare's jeremiad
against a written constitution. Whether it was so in 1828, in 1987
there is a tendency to translate questions of justice and equality
into technical issues of legal constitutionality, and then to treat the
latter as the province of the professionals on the Supreme Court
rather than as the concern of us all. For example, Congress and the
President may approve legislation of dubious legitimacy, arguing
that the constitutional question is for the courts. The courts in
turn are inherently-I want to say constitutionally-incapable of
addressing many of the great substantive questions of political morality, and if Legare was right, are professionally incapacitated
from resolving properly those questions they do reach.26
Having accepted much of Legare's criticism, however, I need to
concede as well that he is criticizing my Constitution, the Constitution of text and gloss, precedent and lawyers' argument, the verbal
Constitution that is an ever more complex tradition of discourse
and disagreement. Legare was right that a written Constitution
and the interpretive tradition that arises in its wake serve easily
and often to bemuse and befuddle the well-meaning, and to
strengthen and shelter the unjust.2 7 How many white Americans
before the Civil War avoided the great moral question of slavery
with the tranquilizing reflection that the Constitution recognized
slavery's legality? How many well-to-do Americans today avoid the
great moral question of poverty with the tranquilizing reflection
that the Constitution is a "charter of negative liberties,"2 that

24. Id. at 125. For Bickel's argument, see A. BICKEL,

THE LEAST DANGEROUS

(1962).
25. H. LEGARE, supra note 4, at 125 (emphasis in original).
26. Id. at 123-28.
27. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
28. Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982).
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dealing with poverty is a matter of generosity rather than a fundamental demand of justice? I have intentionally chosen a controversial contemporary example to illustrate another related consequence of my Constitution: its tradition of discussion may lead to
the rejection of my views, to what I and others would regard as the
legitimation of injustice and inequality. If that happens, I will not
be able to deny responsibility completely, to utter a self-exculpatory "It's not me, it's the Constitution," for my Constitution is
what I, along with many others, make of it in discussion, debate,
textual interpretation, ethical insight, verbal obfuscation, and failure of moral vision.
Although I accept the truth of much of Legare's critique, I do
not join in his conclusion that "the whole system is radically
wrong." 2" Why not? The alternative to my Constitution of text and
discussion, of good and evil mixed together, is the utopian vision of
a political order founded on unmixed good. The problem with a
utopia is that once achieved, it leaves no rationale for argument
and no room for dissent. Legare wrote with just such a utopian
vision, I believe, in his case of revolutionary patriots rather like
himself resolving political issues with their "plain, manly, unsophisticated good sense [and] instinct of liberty. 3 0 I have little
doubt such men would build a society agreeable to themselves, but
what about to women, blacks, the poor, and political dissidents? At
least my Constitution recognizes the inevitability of discussion and
the possibility of disagreement and a change of mind or heart.
I have come full circle, of course, and ended up with a Constitution very like Professor Levinson's. Like Professor Levinson, I will
sign. But the enterprise has been worthwhile, at least personally,
because it has compelled me to confront, once again, the moral ambiguity of the Constitution to which I subscribe, and my own moral
responsibility for that Constitution's failures and injustices.

29. H. LEGARE, supra note 4, at 133 (emphasis in original).
30. Id. at 125.

